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Abstract 
Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis (FIH) has been criticized as suffering from a fallacy of 
composition that violates a central thesis of Kalecki. Nevertheless, Minsky’s description of borrowing and 
lending behavior is sufficiently compelling that it continues to drive new research. In this paper we 
propose a modified Kaleckian model in which a behavioral rule captures Minsky’s microeconomic 
argument that firms and banks increase the leverage of new loans during booms, but which translates 
through Kaleckian dynamics into a falling debt-to-capital ratio at a macroeconomic level. The expanding 
loan-to-capital ratio drives a potential instability, but in utilization, rather than debt. 
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1. Introduction 
Hyman Minsky’s influence on post-Keynesian theory is undeniable, yet his most far-reaching idea, the 
financial instability hypothesis (FIH) (Minsky 1977; 1980; 2008) has been criticized on both theoretical 
and empirical grounds. The FIH states that, in the boom phase of a financial cycle, firms steadily increase 
their leverage, thereby moving the entire financial system from a “hedge” position in which profits cover 
payments on both principle and interest to a “Ponzi” position in which profits cover neither, so business 
loans require periodic refinancing. The theoretical critique of the FIH is that it commits a fallacy of 
composition (Lavoie and Seccareccia 2001; Toporowski 2008), in that it ignores Kalecki’s (1969) 
observation that investment decisions taken by firms individually lead to a collective increase in income, 
an essential insight sometimes summarized as “capitalists earn what they spend”. Empirically, Lavoie and 
Seccareccia (2001) display trends in GDP growth and debt-to-equity ratios for six OECD countries and 
argue there is no obvious, stable, relationship between the two. Moreover, in an econometric analysis of 
annual data for Canada they show that, if anything, debt-to-equity ratios tend to fall during booms, rather 
than rise, as the FIH proposes. 
The position of this paper is that the empirical evidence cannot be denied: debt-to-equity ratios tend to, 
but do not always, fall during booms. However, we also consider Minsky to have proposed a compelling 
microeconomic argument for firm and bank behavior during booms. The argument (Minsky 1980, 
pp.516–517) is that, to the extent that profit income validates past debt, firms and banks feel confident in 
increasing the leverage of new loans. This is possible as long as banks are willing to lend and, crucially, 
that they are willing to refinance existing loans. If banks curtail lending and refinancing operations, then 
firms that have taken “Ponzi” positions cannot repay their debts. Minsky’s presentation of this argument 
explicitly takes Kalecki’s theory into account, but still commits the fallacy of composition noted above. 
The fallacy is introduced at the end of the argument, in which it is assumed, but not demonstrated, that 
increasing leverage of loans (a flow) leads necessarily to increasing leverage of debt (a stock). 
In this paper we begin with an essentially Kaleckian model and then introduce a behavioral relationship 
consistent with Minsky’s microeconomic argument. We are not the first to attempt a union between 
Kalecki and Minsky. Aside from Minsky himself, Lavoie (1995) introduced a “Minsky-Steindl” model 
that was later taken up and expanded upon by Hein (2006; 2007). In these papers, the debt-to-capital ratio 
is held fixed in the short run, and then either the effect of the debt-to-capital ratio on utilization is studied 
in a comparative static analysis or the debt-to-capital ratio is endogenized in a long-run analysis. A 
distinct analysis was carried out by Ryoo (2013), who argued in favor of the FIH, particularly in the long 
run. Ryoo makes two departures from a standard analysis, first by considering equity rather than bank 
finance and second by closing the model by adjusting the debt level rather than utilization. As we follow 
Minsky by focusing on bank lending and Kalecki by focusing on changes in capacity utilization, the 
model presented in this paper is not directly comparable to Ryoo’s. 
While remaining close to Kalecki’s formulation of economic dynamics, we depart from the conventional 
Kaleckian analysis. We introduce an investment function through an accounting balance that includes 
loans, and then, following Minsky’s arguments, propose a dynamic adjustment mechanism for the loan-
to-capital ratio that leads it to expand during booms. For a plausible range of parameter values this 
destabilizes utilization, while the debt-to-capital ratio has stable dynamics, and tends to decline during the 
boom. The behavior of the debt-to-capital ratio is consistent with the empirical evidence presented by 
Lavoie and Seccareccia (2001), while the instability is consistent with Minsky (1977; 1980). 
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2. A Kaleckian model with Minskian behavior 
As noted in the Introduction, in the model we aim to capture two concepts: Kalecki’s macroeconomic 
argument that the contribution of investment to effective demand leads to rising profits and Minsky’s 
microeconomic argument that firms and banks agree to increase the leverage of new loans in the course of 
a boom. Everything else in the model is kept as simple as possible. In particular, we assume a closed 
economy with no government sector, and keep fixed some parameters that are normally assumed to vary 
in Kaleckian models. 
Kaleckian dynamics 
Following Kalecki, future physical investment (the “next period” in the model this paper) is financed 
through current-period loans and retained profits, net of debt payments. Mathematically, investment is 
given by 
 1 ,t t t tI L iDρ+ = Π + −   (1) 
where It+1 is next period-investment, financed by the retained fraction ρ of total profits Πt from the current 
period, as well as bank loans Lt, net of debt payments at a rate i on the total debt Dt. 
Debt stock in the next period is given by current period debt, less current debt payments, plus current-
period loans. Thus, in this model loans are viewed as being negotiated through the current period and are 
recorded against firms’ accounts in the next period, 
 ( )1 1 .t t tD i D L+ = − +   (2) 
GDP, Yt, is proportional to the capital stock Kt, 
 ,t t tY u Kκ=   (3) 
where ut is utilization, defined so that it is equal to one at a “normal” utilization level and κ is capital 
productivity at normal utilization. The debt stock follows standard “perpetual inventory” dynamics with a 
fixed depreciation rate, 
 ( )1 11 .t t tK K Iδ+ += − +   (4) 
Dividing equation (1) by Kt gives the following equation in intensive variables, 
 ,t t tg u izρπκ λ= + −   (5) 
where g is gross increase in the capital stock due to investment, π is the profit share, λt the loan-to-capital 
ratio, and zt the debt-to-capital ratio. Dividing equation (2) through by Kt and combining with equation (4) 
gives 
 ( ) ( )11 1 .t t tg z i zδ λ++ − = − +   (6) 
We close the model by equating savings and investment. Because our focus is on the investment function, 
the savings equation is particularly simple, 
 .t t t tS sY s u Kκ= =   (7) 
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As the notation indicates, in this paper we hold the savings rate s fixed, as well as variables that affect 
savings, including the interest rate i, profit share π, and the retention ratio ρ. These are clearly extreme 
assumptions, as they preclude analysis of changing savings behavior through a changing income 
distribution; that is, they preclude a treatment of an essential feature of Kalecki’s theory. As discussed 
above, this is a deliberate choice that we make in order to focus attention on a peculiarly Minskian 
behavioral relationship. As we shall show, the Minskian dynamics alone lead to endogenous changes in 
utilization. A full analysis would include cyclical or trend changes in distributional parameters, which 
would enrich the dynamics, but complicate the presentation. 
Equating savings and investment means that we can substitute sκut for g in the equations above, so they 
become 
 ( ) ,t t ts u izκ ρπ λ− = −   (8) 
 ( ) ( )11 1 .t t t ts u z i zκ δ λ++ − = − +   (9) 
The profit retention ratio 
Before continuing, we pause to discuss the profit retention ratio ρ, because it has not been given the same 
attention in post-Keynesian literature as have the other distributional parameters. Sasaki and Fujita (2012) 
explicitly treat the retention ratio in a Kaleckian model with debt dynamics and argue that it must be less 
than one to obtain sensible results. Lavoie (1995, pp.165–166) explicitly includes the retention ratio in the 
savings function in his Minsky-Steindl model, while allowing it to change implicitly in the investment 
function. 
The retention ratio is one less than the payout ratio, and payout policies have been extensively studied and 
discussed both empirically and theoretically in the finance literature. In common with much of financial 
theory since the 1960s, this large literature has been driven by a “puzzle” (that is, empirical contradiction 
of theoretical expectations), in this instance why companies pay dividends at all. Miller and Modigliani 
(MM) (1961) argue that a rational investor should be indifferent as to whether they receive dividends or 
capital gains. Others, noting that the theory is inconsistent with the facts, introduce market imperfections 
and other adjustments to the MM model. These theories are incompatible with the post-Keynesian 
assumption of fundamental uncertainty, but a similar criticism of MM has been raised in a post-Keynesian 
context as well (Gordon 1992). While it is not the topic of this paper, we would agree with the argument 
that fundamental uncertainty explains in a natural way why investors value cash distributions differently 
than capital gains. One argument is that, in a fundamentally uncertain world (and not merely a risky one, 
as in Bhattacharya 1979), a “bird in the hand” is valuable (Findlay and Williams 2000, p.192; Baker and 
Weigand 2015, p.134). Another is that the past stream of dividends is the main source of information on 
future dividends (Gordon 1989, p.24). 
The classic empirical paper on payout policies is Lintner (1956), who found that most of the firms he 
studied set target dividend payout rates. Actual payout rates tracked the target slowly over time, with full 
adjustment taking multiple years. In the decades since that paper was published, there has been a steady 
erosion of dividends. This has been partly offset by a rise in stock repurchases, but in a recent review, 
Baker and Weigand (2015, p.131) note that total payouts have declined. Among the “stylized facts” 
compiled by Baker and Weigand (p. 138), dividend payments remain large in absolute terms and are 
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important to investors, analysts, and firms; a rise in payouts is normally met with an increase in share 
price; and there is no single theory that explains dividend policies. 
In the present paper, as noted earlier, we assume an unchanging retention ratio in the short run. To the 
extent that Lintner’s (1956) observations remain true today, a more realistic assumption might be a 
constant payout in the short run, with a gradual adjustment toward a target rate. In order to focus on 
Minksian loan dynamics, we defer that analysis to a future paper. 
Minskian behavior 
In Minsky’s theory, profits validate past investment and current debt payments. If an economy is starting 
to do well, but it recently had not, it will have liability structures that reflect the recent past, with margins 
of safety that ensure continued operation despite poor performance. As the economy begins to do well, in 
Minsky’s (1977, p.24) words, 
Existing debts are easily validated and units that were heavily in debt prospered; it paid to lever. 
After the event, it becomes apparent that the margins of safety built into debt structures were too 
great. As a result, over a period in which the economy does well, views about acceptable debt 
structure change. In the deal-making that goes on between banks, investment bankers, and 
businessmen, the acceptable amount of debt to use in financing various types of activity and 
positions increases. 
We capture this behavior in the model by proposing that firms and the banks that lend to them expect the 
economy to be at a particular utilization level ut*, and they make borrowing and lending agreements– as 
expressed by the loan-to-capital ratio λt – on that basis. Because firms set prices based on a fixed markup, 
the difference between anticipated and realized profits is proportional to the difference between 
anticipated and realized utilization, which gives a windfall (retained) profit rate wt per unit of capital, 
 ( )* .t t tw u uρπκ= −   (10) 
At the start of a recovery, the windfall is positive, so that profits “easily” validate past debt. This 
encourages both borrowing firms and lending banks to revise their assessments of risk, and in the next 
period they increase the loan-to-capital ratio by a multiple of the windfall profit rate, 
 1 .t t twλ λ α+ = +   (11) 
In this paper we assume simple adaptive expectations, in which expected utilization equals previous 
period utilization, 
 * 1.t tu u −=   (12) 
From equations (10) and (11), the loan-to-capital ratio then obeys 
 1 .t tuλ αρπκ+∆ = ∆   (13) 
To make use of this equation, we take first differences of equation (8) and combine with equation (13) to 
find a second-order difference equation 
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( )
( )
2
1 1
1
.t t t t t
s iu u u u z
s s
α ρπ
ρπ κ ρπ− −
+ −
∆ ≡ ∆ − ∆ = ∆ − ∆
− −
  (14) 
If there is no Minskian adjustment mechanism, so that α is zero, then this reduces to a simple statement 
that the debt-to-capital ratio rises or falls in step with the profit rate when the loan-to-capital ratio is fixed. 
For an arbitrary value of α this equation gives rise to autonomous changes in utilization. 
Later, it will be convenient to express all variables in terms of small deviations from conditions at normal 
utilization, u = 1. We write 
 01 , ,t t t tu z zε ς= + = +   (15) 
where z0 is the debt ratio at normal utilization. In terms of these variables, equation (14) becomes 
 
( )
( )
2
1
1
.t t t
s i
s s
α ρπ
ε ε ς
ρπ κ ρπ−
+ −
∆ = ∆ − ∆
− −
  (16) 
This is a dynamical equation in two variables. For a complete system we need a further equation that 
gives the change in the debt-to-capital ratio. 
Debt dynamics 
A dynamical equation for the debt-to-capital ratio emerges when we combine equations (8) and (9) to 
eliminate λt: 
 ( ) ( )11 .t t t ts u z z s uκ δ κ ρπ++ − = + −   (17) 
The change in the debt ratio is then given by 
 ( ) .
1 1
t
t t t
t t
ss uz z u
s u s u
κ ρπκ δ
κ δ κ δ
−−
∆ = − +
+ − + −
  (18) 
The sign of the coefficient on zt is negative during a recovery and subsequent boom, in which 
accumulation exceeds depreciation. This means that its dynamics are stable, so the debt-to-capital ratio 
chases an asymptotic value z* that can be found by setting equation (18) equal to zero, 
 ( )* .t
t t
u s sz
s u s u
κ ρπ ρπ
κ δ δ κ
− −
= =
− −
  (19) 
From this equation it can be seen that when utilization goes up, z* goes down, meaning that in a boom, the 
debt ratio will tend to go down, other factors remaining the same. This is consistent with Lavoie and 
Seccareccia’s (2001) findings. Also consistent with their findings is that utilization and the debt-to-capital 
ratio do not have to move in opposite directions if other factors – the profit share, depreciation rate, and 
fraction of retained earnings – are changing at the same time, or if the debt-to-capital ratio is not already 
near its steady-state value. 
In terms of the small parameters εt and ςt we introduced above, and keeping only first-order terms, we find 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )0 2
1
.
1 1 1
t t t
s ss z
s s s
κ ρπ κ ρπ δκ δ
ς ς ε
κ δ κ δ κ δ
− − −−
∆ ≅ − + + +
+ − + − + −
  (20) 
With equation (16), this is the second of two linear difference equations that together make up a discrete 
dynamic system. The essential question in Minsky’s theory is whether the system is stable or not. We 
therefore turn to a stability analysis. 
3. Stability analysis 
For the stability analysis, it is convenient to work in continuous time. Equation (16) is second-order in 
time, and in continuous time it becomes 
 
( )
( )
1
.
s i
s s
α ρπ
ε ε ς
ρπ κ ρπ
+ −
= −
− −
     (21) 
While this is second-order, it is straightforward to integrate it to find a first-order equation, 
 
( )
( )0
1
.
s iv
s s
α ρπ
ε ε ς
ρπ κ ρπ
+ −
= + −
− −
   (22) 
In this equation, v0 is the “velocity” of utilization at normal utilization – that is, it is the value of ε  when ε 
and ς are both zero. During a boom phase this velocity is expected to be positive. 
In continuous time, equation (20) for the change in the debt-to-capital ratio becomes 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
0
0 2
0 0 0
1
,
1 1 1
s sn z
n n n
κ ρπ κ ρπ δ
ς ς ε
− − −
= − + + +
+ + +
   (23) 
where n0 is the net rate of growth of the capital stock at normal utilization, 
 0 .n sκ δ= −   (24) 
The stability of the system can be determined by the eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix in the pair of 
dynamical equations (22) and (23), 
 
( )
( )
( )( )
( )
0
2
00
1
.
1
11
s i
s s
s n
nn
α ρπ
ρπ κ ρπ
κ ρπ δ
 + −
− 
− − =  − − −
 ++ 
M   (25) 
The signs of the eigenvalues, in turn, can be determined by the trace and determinant of this matrix. The 
trace is given by 
 ( ) 0
0
1
Tr ,
1
s n
s n
α ρπ
ρπ
+ −
= −
− +
M   (26) 
while the determinant is 
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( )
( )0
2
00
11Det .
11
sni
n sn
α ρπδ
ρπ
+ −−
= −
+ −+
M   (27) 
It is convenient to re-write these expressions in terms of a convenient parameter – the fraction fRE of gross 
investment that is funded by retained earnings. In this model, the parameter is given by 
 RE 1 .f s
ρπ
= −   (28) 
Each of the parameters on the right-hand-side is held constant in this paper, so the left-hand side is 
constant as well. The parameter fRE is a measure of leverage, so it may appear odd to for it to be fixed in 
this way, when leverage clearly increases over time through the loan dynamics given by equation (11). 
The resolution to the apparent paradox can be found from equation (8), where fRE is seen to be 
proportional to the ratio of new loans net of debt payments relative to the capital stock, while λt is the 
ratio of total new loans to the capital stock, without subtracting debt payments. As the debt payment is 
fixed in any particular period, an increase in total lending increases utilization at a fixed value of fRE. To 
reiterate an earlier point, this is a consequence of the particularly simple assumptions we have made in 
this paper in the interest of focusing on the Minskian loan dynamics. 
In terms of fRE, the trace and determinant are given by 
 ( ) RE 0
RE 0
1 1
Tr ,
1 1
f n
f n
α+ −
= −
− +
M   (29) 
 
( )
( ) RE0
2
0 RE0
1 11Det .
1 11
fni
n fn
αδ + −−
= −
+ −+
M   (30) 
An essential requirement for stability in this system is that the trace be negative (in which case the 
determinant can be shown to almost certainly be positive). This condition can be expressed as a constraint 
on the parameter α, which must lie below a critical level, 
 ( )0 RE
RE 0
1 1 1 1.
1
n f
f n
α
 
≤ − + − + 
  (31) 
In order to provide an estimate for fRE, we examined annual data on nonfinancial businesses in the US 
from 1946 through 2014 from the Federal Reserve. We calculated a raw series as one plus net lending 
divided by capital expenditure, and then smoothed the series over business cycles by applying a Hodrick-
Prescott filter with a parameter λHP = 6.25, as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for annual data. The 
smoothed series shows significant variation over time, with a mean value of 0.83 between 1950 and 1960, 
of 0.73 between 1970 and 1980, and 0.98 between 1990 and 2000. 
With these historical values, we propose as an example, that retained earnings are 80% of total 
investment, while the net capital stock growth is 2.0%/year. In that case, the critical value for α is 0.25. 
So, if banks and firms increase the lending-to-capital ratio by less than one-quarter of the previous period 
windfall profit rate, then the dynamics are stable; otherwise, they are unstable. 
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Implications 
The propensity to increase loan leverage with higher than expected profits, which is represented by α in 
the model, is not a conventional parameter, so estimates of it do not exist. However, a threshold value of 
0.25 does not seem particularly restrictive, and it is plausible to imagine that firms and banks might adjust 
loan-to-debt ratios upwards by more than a quarter of the previous-period windfall profit rate. 
The critical value of α falls if the fraction of new investment from retained profits, fRE, rises, and the 
dependence is quite sensitive. In this model, when fRE = 1, the critical value of α is zero, and any degree of 
lending is destabilizing, while at fRE = 0.60 and n0 = 2.0%/year, the critical value for α is 0.68. The critical 
value also depends on the net growth rate of the capital stock at normal utilization, n0, but not sensitively: 
if fRE = 0.80, then the critical value for α varies only from 0.25 and 0.27 as n0 varies widely, from 0%/year 
to 10%/year. Given the relative insensitivity to n0, a reasonable approximation to the threshold value of α 
is 
 
RE
1 1.
f
α ≤ −   (32) 
Returning to the US data, the critical value corresponding to the mean fRE between 1950 and 1960 is 0.21, 
between 1970 and 1980 it is 0.38, and between 1990 and 2000 it is 0.02. It is plausible that the response 
of loan leverage to rising profits could be stronger than these levels, which would lead to instability. 
The fraction of new investment from retained profits is affected both by savings behavior and the 
retention ratio. The model developed above suggests that the combination of these variables, captured by 
fRE, with the response of firms and banks to rising profits, captured by α, is important determinant of 
economic stability. 
4. Discussion 
The model presented in this paper addresses a weakness of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis 
(FIH), a fallacy of composition that conflicts directly with Kalecki’s theory of economic dynamics. The 
resolution of the problem leads to an empirically more acceptable outcome – in the model, the debt-to-
capital ratio falls during a boom – as well as to an instability arising directly from a Minskian behavioral 
relationship. The behavioral relationship captures Minsky’s narrative of how firms and banks gradually 
adjust liability structures during a boom to allow for loans with higher leverage. However, in contrast to 
Minsky’s claim, higher loan leverage does not translate into higher debt leverage, due to Kaleckian 
macrodynamics. To focus specifically on these issues we set aside another important aspect of Kalecki’s 
theory, the influence of the functional income distribution on the aggregate saving rate. This is not an 
essential limitation of the model presented in this paper, which could be extended to a full Kaleckian 
analysis. Such an analysis should also include behavioral responses to changing interest rates. 
The instability in the model is in capacity utilization, rather than the debt ratio. In the model, and in 
contrast to a conventional Kaleckian treatment, utilization has endogenous dynamics that can be either 
stable or unstable. The potential instability arises from the Minskian behavioral relationship, and occurs at 
plausible parameter values. This suggests that instability could be a frequent, if not inevitable, 
consequence of Minskian microeconomics, which is a weaker statement than the FIH, but consistent with 
Minsky’s contention that capitalism has inherent instabilities. Missing from the paper is an exploration of 
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fragility – that is, the patterns of behavior that drive the system from one of rising utilization to one of 
falling utilization. In the model presented in this paper the most likely source of fragility is that the 
economy hits a capacity constraint. In the run-up to the boom, the system as a whole has seen a fall in the 
debt-to-capital ratio, but as firms are taking on more leverage with each loan, it is likely that many 
individual firms will follow Minsky’s path from hedge to Ponzi positions, and will begin to fail when 
tight capacity margins lead to price fluctuations and delayed delivery of intermediate inputs. 
The expression for the threshold value of α – that is, for the propensity of firms and banks to increase loan 
leverage when profits are higher than expected – is surprisingly simple. As shown in equation (32), to a 
good approximation it is simply one over the fraction of gross investment funded by retained profits, 
minus one. According to the model, the more firms rely on their own cash flows to finance new 
investment, the lower the threshold between the stable and unstable regimes. The simple expression 
would doubtless be replaced by a more complex one in a more complete model, but it suggests a possible 
avenue for empirical study. The fraction of gross investment funded by retained profits depends on the 
retention ratio, both directly and through its influence on saving behavior, and this parameter has not been 
examined in detail in the post-Keynesian literature. Both the model proposed in this paper and post-
Keynesian modeling in general could benefit from a more realistic representation of payout policies. 
5. Conclusion 
Minsky’s theories have been productive, generating considerable new research. However, his most 
sweeping idea – that modern capitalist economies are inherently unstable and subject to financial fragility 
– has been critiqued on both empirical and theoretical grounds. We accept the critique, but take Minsky’s 
argument as a microeconomic basis for specifying a behavioral relationship in a Kaleckian model. The 
model features stable dynamics for the debt-to-capital ratio, consistent with observation, but potentially 
unstable endogenous dynamics for capacity utilization. The instability arises directly from the Minskian 
behavioral relationship. 
While other authors (including Minsky) have sought to combine Kalecki’s and Minsky’s ideas, the model 
in this paper is novel in two ways: first, because it uses Minsky’s microeconomic arguments, rather than 
his macroeconomic ones, to motivate a model; second, because it yields endogenous dynamics for 
utilization and debt. Aside from the Minskian parameter in the model – the propensity of firms and banks 
to increase loan leverage when profits are higher than expected – the crucial parameter determining 
stability is the fraction of gross investment funded by retained profits. 
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